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PEER HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX OF
THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972:
WHERE'S THE INTENT?
Chantal N. Senatus*
As a ninth grader, I was assaulted in a classroom by four boys
who held my arms and legs and fondled me. The school took no
action until it was pushed to do so by a female guidance coun-
selor and . . . my parents. Because I reported the incident, I
became the butt of jokes and insulting comments until I gradu-
ated. A few years later ... a girl was gang-raped in the same
classroom where I was assaulted.'
Introduction
In public schools 2 across the country, administrators cite increas-
ing incidents of peer sexual harassment. In a 1993 survey of over
1600 girls and boys, four out of five students have faced some form
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1997; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1994. My greatest appreciation to all the people who've supported me
in this process. That includes Greg.
1. Public Pulse: Editorial - Sickening Abuse of Girls, THE OMAHA WORLD HER-
ALD, July 7, 1995, at 10.
2. This paper only discusses sexual harassment in elementary and secondary
schools because, although sexual harassment is rampant in elementary schools, secon-
dary schools and universities, the problems of children and young adults are analyzed
differently. See infra note 19. Because more girls than boys are harassed by teachers
and their peers, this note focuses on female victims.
3. Monica L. Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX
for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2130 (1993) (citing Massachu-
setts Board of Education, Who's Hurt and Who is Liable: Sexual Harassment in Mas-
sachusetts Schools 9 (1986), an article describing sexual harassment incidents as
"common occurrences" in high schools); Elementary school girls remember school
bus incidents where the boys in the back were constantly trying to pull girls out of
their seats and onto the ground in an effort to reach under the girls' shirts to touch
them. Eric Adler, At School, Its No Longer 'Horseplay, Its Harassment; Teasing,
Touching and Taunting Are Creating Fear and Trauma for Some, THE KANSAS CITY
STAR, Jan. 25, 1995, at Fl.
In 1993, Jessica Hasenbank, a student at Fairview Elementary School, "cowered in
fear as she watched six boys slam her girlfriends onto the ground, stuff grass in their
mouths to prevent screams, made lewd remarks and tried to strip them." Kristina
Sauerwien, A New Lesson in Schools: Sexual Harassment is Unacceptable, L.A.
TIMES, August 1, 1994, at El.
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of sexual harassment in school.' More than ever before, students
and their parents are reporting these incidents and litigating them.5
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 has become the
vehicle for sexual harassment suits against educational institu-
tions.6 Title IX states that "no person... shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any educational program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance .... -7 Congress enacted Title
IX in response to the growing concern about sex discrimination in
education institutions,8 seeking it to withhold federal funds from
institutions that continue to practice sex discrimination.9 At the
time of its enactment, Title IX has been used to challenge discrimi-
natory admissions policies, 10 sex-based allocation of federal funds
4. Carrie N. Baker, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based Harassment of
Students, 43 EMORY L. J. 271, 278, n. 38 (1994) (citing Educational Found. of the Am.
Ass'n of Univ. Women, Hostile Hallways: The AAUW survey of sexual harassment in
American Schools (1993)). This survey covered public school children in grades 8-11.
5. Kristina Sauerwien, A New Lesson in Schools: Sexual Harassment is Unaccept-
able, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at El. The Department of Education's Civil Rights
office has recorded 143 student complaints of sexual harassment in elementary and
secondary schools during the 1992-1993 school year. Only fifteen were reported dur-
ing the 1987-1988 school year.
The Supreme Court, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992),
recognized that the individual may receive monetary damages for intentional sexual
harassment. This enabled parties who were unsatisfied by administrative avenues to
seek retribution through the legal system.
6. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Ca. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d
1447 (9th Cir. 1995).
7. 20 U.S.C. §§1681-1686. Title IX was created to protect individuals within fed-
erally funded institutions from sexual discrimination. 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07; see
also, 117 CONG. REC. 30411 (1971) (an alternate proposal asserting the same goals as
the current statute offered by Senator McGovern titled "Prohibition Against Sex
Discrimination.")
8. See Pamela W. Kernie, Protecting Individuals from Sex Discrimination: Com-
pensatory Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 155, 156 (1992) (describing the objectives and goals of Title IX through its legis-
lative history).
9. 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971); Kernie, supra note 8, at 156-57. Similarly, in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Supreme Court held that
Title IX impliedly provides a private cause of action that allows the individual to seek
injunctive relief through the courts rather than the Office for Civil Rights.
10. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974)
(challenging an educational institution's application of higher admissions standards to
girls in an effort to equalize the male to female ratio in the school). Other policies
included discrimination based on marital and parental status. Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr.
Area Sch. Dist., (3d Cir. 1990) (challenging the dismissal of a female student from a
high school chapter of the National Honor Society when she became pregnant after
engaging in pre-marital sexual activity).
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in school athletics programs 1 and discriminatory hiring and pro-
motion policies. 12
More recently, Title IX has been used to combat sexual harass-
ment.13 The Department of' Education, Office of Civil Rights
("OCR"), the agency that administers Title IX claims, has adopted
a broad definition of sexual harassment:
[S]exual harassment consists of verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an employer or an
agent of a recipient [of federal funds] that denies, limits, pro-
vides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, serv-
ices or treatment protected under Title IX. 4
This broad OCR definition accommodates Title IX suits for sexu-
ally harassing behavior and non-sexual harassment 5 that arise out
of the desire to discriminate on the basis of gender.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two major types of sex-
ual harassment. 16 The first, quid pro quo sexual harassment, is de-
fined as harassment initiated by a superior who demands sexual
favors in exchange for a "benefit" to the victim.17 The second, hos-
tile or abusive environment harassment, occurs where multiple in-
cidents of offensive conduct produce an environment violative of a
victim's civil rights.' 8
11. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Bennett v. West Tex. State
Univ., 799 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
12. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982); Chance v. Rice, 989
F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1993).
13. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Ca. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d
1447 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
14. Sherer, supra note 3, at 2126 (quoting THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC 2 (1986)).
15. For example, Title IX, when interpreted through Title VII, may also prohibit
marital, parental or 'family status' distinctions. Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Col-
leges and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849
(1987). In Mabry, the plaintiff alleged that she was fired from her job because of her
gender and her marital status. Id. at 312-13. The court also stated that Title VII is the
most appropriate analog for defining substantive Title IX standards. Id. at 317 n.6.
16. These definitions arise out of Title VII case law and are applicable to Title IX
cases through Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
17. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62 (describing how a bank manager asked the plaintiff
to start a relationship with him, putting her in fear of loosing her job). Id. at 60.
18. Id. at 67(finding that hostile environment sexual harassment exists when sex-
ual harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim's working environment."'); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 613 F. Supp.
1360, 1366 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1136.(3d Cir. 1986)(citing EEOC's 1980
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment).
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A number of courts also recognize peer harassment or student-
on-student sexual harassment 19 as a sub-category of hostile envi-
ronment harassment. 20 Peer harassment in an educational environ-
ment deprives the victim of the ability to learn within that
environment.2 1 Courts have recognized the schools' duty to pro-
tect students from discriminatory conduct, whether quid pro quo or
hostile environment, by teachers in their employ.22 However,
courts divide over whether it is the school's responsibility to com-
bat deleterious behavior when the perpetrators are fellow
students.23
This Note argues that in peer harassment cases, school districts
should face liability under a "known or should have known" stan-
dard where the school's intent to discriminate may be determined
by the circumstances of the case. Part I provides a brief historical
overview of Title IX and the traditional forms of hostile environ-
ment harassment that it has been used to combat, demonstrating
that courts use the statute to punish harassment where the school
has reason to know of the harassment and fails to take appropriate
action. Part II explores a subset of hostile environment cases
where U.S. circuit courts are divided-peer sexual harassment
cases, and analyzes the rationale supporting each position. Part III
provides guidelines for when courts should extend Title IX protec-
tion to peer sexual harassment claims and articulates standards for
school liability.
19. Through Title IX, courts have implied a duty on the part of school officials to
protect children who are in school custody. Peer harassment may be compared to co-
worker hostile environment cases under Title VII. However, there is a fundamental
difference. Adults are on more or less equal footing. In elementary and high school,
peer pressures are high and children are not fully aware of appropriate behavior. The
victim in elementary school is less likely to know behavior is inappropriate and is less
likely to file suit.
20. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1562 (N.D. Ca. 1993), reh'g
granted, 949 F.Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 53-
54 (D.Conn. 1995).
21. See Petaluma at 1575 (stating that the victim was deprived because she was
"driven to quit an education program because of the severity of the sexual harassment
she [was] forced to endure in the program.")
22. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that a
student may bring suit under Title IX for sexual harassment by a teacher). Other
school employees, however, may not face liability under the same rules. For example,
in Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993), the court determined that the
school could not be held liable for the acts of the school security guard where the
guard assaulted one fourteen-year old plaintiff and a week later kidnaped and raped
her twin sister.
23. See infra Part II.
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I. Hostile Environment Harassment Under Title IX
Title IX has evolved gradually. The Supreme Court identified an
implied private right of action in 1979 allowing individuals to sue
institutions directly. 4 Before Cannon v. University of Chicago,25
Title IX was used only as an administrative tool, where the Depart-
ment of Education could withhold funds from an institution prac-
ticing discrimination. 6 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Venison, a 1992
Title VII harassment case, the Court recognized quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment
under Title IX.27 A 1992 Supreme Court decision cited Meritor,
finding hostile environment harassment actionable under Title
IX.28 The Supreme Court's acceptance of these actions29 under Ti-
tle IX allowed courts to make the leap to school liability in peer
sexual harassment cases. Title IX's interpretation in case law en-
ables it to fulfill its purpose- to protect the individual from sexual
discrimination in education.3 °
24. Although Title IX does not explicitly provide for a private cause of action, the
Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
The plaintiff was denied admission to defendant's law school because of her sex and
the Court found that the plaintiff was a member of the protected class and that there
was an legislative intent to create a private cause of action. Id.
25. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
26. The OCR would investigate a complaint filed by a student through the
school's internal grievance procedure or the Department of Education. 34 C.F.R.
§100.7 (1989). Upon discovering a violation, the OCR could issue a warning request-
ing that the school change its policies. 34 C.F.R. §100.8 (1989). Should the institution
continue to ignore the violation, the OCR can terminate federal funding through ad-
ministrative proceedings. Id. Congress has yet to use the power to terminate federal
funds. Tamar Lewin, Students Use Law on Discrimination in Sex-Abuse Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1995, at Al, A13.
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. Franklin v. Gwinnett City Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
29. Lower courts found it difficult to define hostile environment harassment under
these provisions because it was difficult to determine how much the victim must suffer
in order to declare the environment a hostile and abusive one. See Harris v. Forklift
Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (resolving circuit conflicts as to whether serious psycho-
logical injury is required for "abusive work environment" harassment).
30. The administrative process is not the most effective means of exacting justice
or protecting the individual. Kernie, supra note 8, at 159-60. The student and her
family must bare the consequences related to reporting a professor or a classmate
even after the policy in the school changes. See Bella English, A Mother's Mission,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, April 23, 1995, at 22. After Elizabeth had Thorpe, a fellow
classmate, arrested for sexual harassment, his teammates resented her. The principal
held a school wide meeting, admonishing the students not to make judgments based
on accusations. Id. By the time the problem is resolved, the victim may no longer be
attending the school or the harasser may no longer be present. In Franklin, the
harassing teacher resigned when a complaint was filed with the OCR. 503 U.S. at 60.
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A. Hostile Work Environment and Its Development
Courts primarily interpret Title IX through federal anti-discrimi-
nation law.3' In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,32 the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized a hostile environment claim under Title
VII.33 Though the plaintiff never formally complained about her
treatment, the Court held that an absence of notice "does not nec-
essarily insulate that employer from liability. '34  The plaintiff
agreed to a sexual relationship with her supervisor because he
might fire her.35 The supervisor touched her breasts in the pres-
ence of other employees and fondled other women in the office.36
The district court determined that because Vinson's relationship
with Taylor was "voluntary," she was not subjected to sexual har-
assment.37 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the plaintiff
was the victim of hostile environment harassment. 38 In determin-
ing whether the supervisor's behavior was "unwelcome," the Court
examined the harasser's conduct, not the plaintiff's participation in
the relationship.39 The trier of fact may find that the behavior was
unwelcome, taking into account that her supervisor pressured her
The OCR determined that the school was in compliance with Title IX because Hill
had resigned and the school had implemented a grievance procedure. Id.
31. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), states that: "It shall be unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex
32. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
33. Id. at 73.
34. Id. at 72. Nor does the existence of a grievance procedure insulate the em-
ployer from liability. Id. In this case the grievance procedure did not specifically
address sexual harassment and the victim was required to report the harassment to
her supervisor. Her failure to evoke the procedure was not surprising considering
that she was required to report the harassment to her harasser. Id. at 72-73.
35. 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
36. 477 U.S. at 60."
37. Id. at 61. The District Court decided that if plaintiff did engage in a sexual
relationship with her supervisor, it was a voluntary one and there was no sexual har-
assment. Id. at 68. The Supreme Court points out that "the fact that sex-related
conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the complainant was not forced to partici-
pate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title
VII. Id.
38. Id. at 62. The Court looked at the "terms, conditions [and] privileges of [her]
employment" as well as her supervisor's harassment in making its determination. 477
U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
39. 477 U.S. at 68. See Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp.
162, 174 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (indicating that to be unwelcome, the harassment must
"have interfered with a reasonable person's ... performance and ... emotional well-
being." (internal citation omitted).
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into the relationship through his ability to take away her job. The
Court applied agency principles to impute liability for employee
actions on the bank while acknowledging that agency "principles
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII."40
The Supreme Court recently determined that the victim could
prevail in a hostile environment claim "[s]o long as the environ-
ment [c]ould reasonably be perceived ... as hostile or abusive. 41
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., during the victim's two years of
employment, the president often insulted the petitioner based on
her gender in front of other employees. 2 The president apologized
and promised not to do it again after the petitioner informed him
that his actions were unacceptable. 43 However, he continued belit-
tling her until she quit.44 The lower courts found that though Har-
ris may have been offended by the comments, it was not enough to
affect her "psychological well-being. '45 The Supreme Court re-
versed and explained the breadth of the hostile work environment
prohibition:
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environ-
ment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psy-
chological well-being, can . .. detract from employees' job
performance .... Whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abu-
sive' can be determined only by looking at all of the
circumstances. 4 6
The lower courts' focus on whether there was concrete psychologi-
cal harm or injury was unwarranted. Because no single factor is
40. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1995) (indicating that if the employer was reckless or
negligent, a known or should have known standard of liability is implied). However,
lower courts in Title VII cases have also used §219(2)(d) to impute liability on the
employer based on apparent authority-that the employee acted in the employer's
place or with the employer's consent. See Fredrick J. Lewis and Thomas L. Hender-
son, Employer Liability for "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created
by Supervisors: The Search For An Appropriate Standard, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 667,
674-75 (1995).
41. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)(citing Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). The Court decided both Meritor and Harris
under Title VII.
42. 510 U.S. at 19. He called her a "dumb-ass woman" and suggested that they go
to a hotel to discuss a pay raise. Id.
43. Id.
44. He asked her in front of other employees while she was dealing with a cus-
tomer whether she promised the customer sex Saturday night. Id.
45. Id. at 20.
46. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
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required by the Court, the victim is not prevented from bringing
suit if there is no serious psychological or economic harm.
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools4 7 greatly expanded
the remedial power of courts in harassment suits brought under
Title IX. The seventh grade plaintiff was sexually harassed by her
sports coach. 8 Through analogy to Meritor, Franklin established
that courts should interpret Title IX in light of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.49 Because sexual harassment is a valid cause of
action under Title VII, the Court stated that Title IX forbids a
school from discriminating on the basis of sex.5 0 Through Title VII
standards,5' the Court determined that sexual harassment existed.
Hill interrupted Franklin's classes and interfered with her ability to
learn. 2 The Supreme Court created a right to damages in sexual
harassment suits brought under Title IX.53 "[W]here legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
47. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
48. Id. at 63. Mr. Hill, the sports coach, asked her about her sexual experiences
with her boyfriend and engaged her in other sexual discussions. Id. He also re-
quested that she be excused from classes, took her to a private office and subjected
her to coercive sexual intercourse. Id. His behavior constituted hostile environment
harassment because it is clear that no benefit was conferred on the victim as in quid
pro quo harassment.
49. Id. at 75 (1992). The Court stated that "the same rule should apply when a
teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for
federal monies to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute
to proscribe." 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
50. Id. at 75. Though the Court compares Title VII to Title IX, the Court does not
specifically address the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of petitioner's argument that rem-
edies under Title IX and Title VII are identical. Id. at 65 n.4. However, the fact that
ranklin did not, leads to a split in Title IX suits as to whether Title IX may be inter-
preted through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or Title VI.
Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §2000d, states in part that "[N]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." A minority of courts, therefore, inter-
pret Title IX through Title VI jurisprudence because of the similarity in the wording
of the statute to Title IX. These courts state that there is no hostile environment
under Title IX because it was patterned after Title VI, which has no provision for the
hostile environment theory. See Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp.
139, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1989), affd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989). "Title IX
simply does not permit a 'hostile environment' claim as described for the workplace
by 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)." Id. at 145. However the court allows that Title IX does
reach "what is defined as quid pro quo." Id.
51. Hostile environment harassment occurs where sexual harassing behavior is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment."' Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986).
52. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63.
53. Id. at 66.
386
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right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done. '54 The Court assumed the
power to compensate a victim for all current and past wrongs. In
order to get damages, however, the victim had to establish that the
school district was aware of, and did nothing to stop, the
harassment.
In light of Meritor, Harris and Franklin, two principles emerge to
guide hostile environment discrimination claims. First, although
the specific knowledge by the employer of the harassing behavior
is not required, courts generally will hold an employer liable under
a "knew or should have known" standard. 6 Second, although
physical abuse certainly will suffice as prima facie harassment,
57
courts will also sustain hostile environment claims where the victim
suffers only emotional abuse.5
B. The Application of Hostile Environment to Title IX
1. The Basis of Liability
Title IX clearly proscribes "the maintenance of a sexually hostile
educational environment in any educational program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance."59
Employers are held liable under Meritor if the employer "knew
or should have known" of harassing incidents.6 ° Where there is a
showing of an abusive environment of which the employer knew or
54. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). The individual may be
compensated for the harassment even when the student no longer attends the school
and/or the teacher has already left or been dismissed prior to the completion of the
suit. The Court also looked at the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 and de-
termined that Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available under Title IX.
Id. at 72.
55. Id. at 74-75. The Court states that allowing damages for unintentional viola-
tion of Title IX would not give the school notice that the institution will be liable for
a monetary award. 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992). The school must be given the opportu-
nity to change the discriminatory policy once they discover it.
56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71-72; see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (applying Meritor and
Title VII to hostile environment cases under Title IX).
57. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (stating that the language of Title IX is not limited to
"economic" or "tangible" harm).
58. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 ("Title IX comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown"). In this case the plaintiff was verbally harassed by
her employer. Id. at 17.
59. Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1289-1290 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). School districts will be found liable for their employees intentional harass-
ment and abuse of a student. Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452,
1465 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
60. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900-01 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72).
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should have known, if exercising reasonable care, the institution
may be held liable "unless the official can show that he or she took
appropriate steps to halt it."' 61 A lack of actual notice of the exist-
ence of a hostile environment will not necessarily insulate an em-
ployer from liability.62 Institutional liability under this theory
depends on negligent failure to act under the circumstances.63
Courts generally impose liability on a defendant institution be-
cause of its failure to remedy the harassment. 64 Meritor also allows
courts to impute liability through agency principles, making the
school district liable for the actions of its employees. 65 The school
may be liable for the torts of its employees "within the scope of
their employment. ' 66 Because teachers' harassment is clearly not
within the scope of employment,67 the school cannot be held liable
"'[Ilt [is] significant that the Court [in Meritor] defined the parameters of such lia-
bility by further holding that an employer could be liable even when the employee
alleging hostile environment harassment fails to notify the employer of his or her
complaint, and even when such employee fails to invoke an existing grievance proce-
dure to protest the alleged harassment."' (emphasis provided).
61. Id. at 901; Deborah 0. v. Lake Cent. Sch. Corp., No. 94-3804, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19194 (7th Cir. 1995). Barmore, the high school band director, became sexu-
ally involved with one of his students. Deborah 0., 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 19194 at *1.
The court required that the plaintiff show that the school district intentionally discrim-
inated against her by proving that the school knew or should have known that the
harassment occurred and failed to take action to stop it. Id. at *9-10.
62. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881. In this case the behavior was such that it was an
accepted tradition at the school and the administration must have known about the
Playboy centerfolds in the men's lounge, which doubled as a conference room and
thought nothing of it. Id. at 887-88; see also Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297 (stating
that the victim's mother alleged that the principal suggested that she and her children
move out of the district rather than trying to accommodate them when she let the
principal know that her children were being harassed by the presence of their mo-
lester in the school).
63. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881
(9th Cir 1991)) (stating that the employer is liable if he or she "fails to take 'immedi-
ate and appropriate' action 'reasonably calculated' to remedy the harm complained
of."). The plaintiffs could not show that she experienced the harassment she claimed.
Before the appeal in this case went to trial, the school district settled out of court for
1.8 million dollars, among the first and largest settlements in a sexual harassment
case. Jim Doyle, Berkeley School Dist. Settles Molestation Suit Against Teacher, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 4, 1994, at A15.
64. After the school became aware of Hill's harassment, the school's administra-
tion took no action to stop it and went as far as to discourage Franklin from pressing
charges. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 64.
65. Id. at 60.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1995) ("A master is subject to
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.")
67. Because it is not part of a teacher's duty to harass students, schools may es-
cape liability under agency principles because the harassment is outside the scope of
employment.
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for hostile environment harassment under this theory. However,
where the school's actions are negligent 68 it may be held liable for
employee torts outside the scope of employment.69 This theory of
liability is reflected in Franklin's "knew or should have known"
standard of liability. 70
2. The Nature of the Harassment
Courts broadly define harassing behavior. Circumstantial evi-
dence of harassment within a defendant institution71 can indicate
whether it may be held liable for hostile environment sexual har-
assment. Courts generally consider several factors: the nature of
the relationship between the harasser and his victim, the duration
of the harassment, and the type of harassment. 72
The court may look to the "disparity in age" between the victim
and the harasser.7 3 When a student is harassed by her teacher,
whom she considers her mentor or superior, it becomes more diffi-
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §219(2)(b) (1995) ("A master is not
subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their em-
ployment, unless ... the master was negligent or reckless ... ").
69. Under §219(2)(b) as applied to Title IX, if the plaintiff can prove that the
actions of the school district were negligent, the school would be liable for its employ-
ees conduct as well as its own. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §219(2)(b)
(1995). Employer negligence may be defined as the failure to remedy a hostile envi-
ronment of which the employer was or should have been aware. See E.E.O.C. v.
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989).
70. A minority use RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §219(2)(d). Section
219(2)(d) states that "[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment unless ... the servant purported to act
or speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority,
or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1995). In a Title VII harassment
suit, for example, if the employer does not have a clear policy against harassment or
the employer does not remedy incidents of harassment in the workplace, the em-
ployer is facilitating the harassment by not punishing harassers.
71. Only an institution may be held liable in an action under Title IX. See Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 695-96 (1979); See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901.
Individuals may not be held liable because they do not receive federal funds.
Bougher, 713 F. Supp. at 143-44; Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.94-0244,
1995 WL.549089, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1995).
72. See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (explaining that OCR looks to "the age.., of the victim(s); the frequency,
duration, repetition, location [and] severity.., of the acts of harassment; [and] the
nature of the context of the incidents."). When Jackie and Rebecca H. were ten and
twelve years old, respectively, they were sexually molested by Hamilton, a high school
band teacher their mother was dating at the time. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1294.
The district court did not apply all of these factors before determining that a jury
could find Hamilton's presence created a hostile environment in which they were un-
able to learn. Id. at 1297.
73. Id. at 1296-97.
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cult for her to prevent the harassment.74 This may cause the vic-
tims to fear the harasser and feel helpless to end the harassment.
Courts are also consistent in deciding that if the harassment oc-
curred over a period of time, there is reason to believe that the
behavior was "so pervasive that the employer must [be] aware of
the existence of a hostile environment. ' 75 The length of time
would make it more likely that the harassment should be noticed
and corrected by the employer.
The court may also examine the severity of the harassment.76
For example, a third-grade plaintiff recovered where harassment
included acts of sodomy in the classroom, on school trips and in the
teacher's home.77 Other circumstances may also be considered in
determining the harassment's severity. When a teacher molested a
student before she attended the school and the student's mother
informed the principal of the effect the teacher's presence had on
her daughter, the school was held liable for failure to act.78
The court considers more than just physical harassment to deter-
mine the existence of a hostile environment. 79 As long as the vic-
74. See Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ca. 1995).
There is the possibility that the student may not understand that she can defend her-
self from inappropriate behavior. In Oona R.-S., a student teacher approached the
plaintiff and fondled her buttocks. In response, the plaintiff hit the student teacher
but did not report the incident because she thought she would get into trouble for
hitting him. Oona R.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1456.
75. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (defining the scope of
hostile environment sexual harassment). For example, in Patricia H., though Jackie
H. was molested in 1987 and 1988, before attending her high school, she was still
affected by a hostile environment during the 1991 and 1992 school years because her
harasser was a teacher in the school. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1295-96. See Does v.
Covington County Sch. Bd., 884 F. Supp. 462 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (allowing the plaintiff
to recover after being harassed for over a year by his third-grade teacher).
76. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1296-97 (stating that the severity of the molestation
is a factor to consider in granting relief).
77. Covington, 884 F. Supp. at 463-64.
78. The first high school hostile environment harassment claim allowed the victims
to recover for current hostile harassment created by incidents which occurred prior to
the victims attending the school because of the severity of the molestation they exper-
ienced as children. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297. The harasser's presence in the
high school years after he molested the girls created a hostile environment for the
them-depriving them of the enjoyment they would have had in attending the school.
Id. at 1297. The girls attended other schools in the two years after the molestation
and once Jackie transferred to Berkeley High School, she avoided any musical activi-
ties to avoid contact with her harasser, though she loved to play the piano. Id. at 1296.
79. See Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 889 & 891 (1st Cir. 1988) (find-
ing that part of the harassment the female medical school resident experienced in-
cluded instances where residents and doctors wrote unsubstantiated complaints about
plaintiff's work and displayed Playboy centerfolds on the walls of the conference
room).
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tim is adversely affected by the hostile environment in a sexual
manner or based on the victim's sex, the factors that create the
environment, such as the frequency and severity of the harass-
ment,80 are considered in determining the school district's liability.
3. Intent Requirement
The minimum requirement to find intent to discriminate in hos-
tile environment cases under Title IX is that the school district
"knew or should have known of the harassment and yet failed to
take appropriate remedial action. ' 81 Also, Franklin v. Gwinnett as-
serts that the school must intentionally discriminate against the vic-
tim in order for the victim to receive damages.82 However the
Court does not articulate what the plaintiff must do to show to
prove intentional harassment.83 Franklin and its progeny indicate
that the failure to take appropriate action may be sufficient. This
failure may be illustrated by facts showing that there is a custom or
policy of not addressing sexual harassment or by the school dis-
trict's failure to investigate incidents or discipline students.84 This
evidence enables courts to determine an intent to discriminate
based on the facts of the case. The plaintiff is allowed to show
intent through the schools actions rather than being required to
show that the school district had an actual intent to discriminate. It
is therefore within the plaintiff's ability to prove. If the school dis-
This case was the first case to recognize a hostile environment claim under Title IX.
It must be noted that although the case does involve a medical student being harassed
by her peers, the circumstances are such that these peers were also employees of the
medical school and considered co-workers. The case explicitly avoids any analysis
concerning peer harassment. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 886-87. Title VII standards for
proving discriminatory treatment were held applicable to claims of sexual harassment
under Title IX. Id. at 897.
80. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
81. Deborah 0. v. Lake Cent. Sch. Corp., 61 F.3d 905, No. 94-3804, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19194, at *10 (7th Cir. July 21 1995)(indicating that a failure to take
appropriate action is the least the plaintiff may be required to show to prove an intent
to harass on the basis of sex); see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-72
(1986); Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1297 (stating that school liability is conditioned on
at least a constructive notice of the harassment and a "knowing failure to act").
82. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74. The Court remanded the case without detailing what
is required for harassment to be intentional. Id. at 76. The Court imputes liability on
the school district after determining that the teacher, Mr. Hill, intentionally sexually
harassed a student Id. at 75
83. But see Oona R.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1465 (determining that illegal harassment
by a teacher is presumptively intentional because the employee is an adult and the
victim is a student).
84. R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. School Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1533-34 (W.D.
Okla. 1993).
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trict failed to act when notified of the harassment, or acted too
slowly or inappropriately, the school district may be liable under
Title IX.
Under hostile environment harassment, a school district is pro-
tected from Title IX liability when it has no reason to know of the
harassing conduct. In a case where an eighth grader and her bas-
ketball coach were involved in a secret sexual relationship, the suit
later brought by the eighth grader was dismissed.85 Though coer-
cive sexual intercourse gave rise to a cause of action under Title IX,
the discriminatory effect was not enough to find the requisite intent
to discriminate.86
II. Peer Harassment
Peer harassment involves peer behavior which constitutes har-
assment and leads to the creation of a hostile environment for the
victim. Part of the creation of this environment is the deprivation
of a student's opportunity to interact with her peers in a normal
and uninhibited fashion. 87 The Office of Civil Rights (hereinafter
"OCR") has taken aggressive posture towards investigating peer
harassment under Title IX.88 Circuit courts, however, are divided
on the question of whether Title IX provides a remedy for peer
sexual harassment plaintiffs.
85. Id. at 1533-1534. When Thorpe, the school basketball coach, was suspected of
having a relationship with a student several years before, the administration warned
him that he would be fired. Id. at 1528. The director took immediate action upon
discovering the relationship between Thorpe and R.L.M.R., suspending Thorpe the
same night. Id. The plaintiff claimed that Thorpe "unreasonabl[y] interfere[d] with
R.L.M.R.'s ability to attend public school and perform her studies and activities in a
normal manner." Id. at 1529.
86. R.L.R., 838 F. Supp. at 1534. The plaintiff had no evidence of intent to dis-
criminate by the school district because the case clearly indicates that the school dis-
trict took immediate action to end the harassment when it was discovered. Id.
Similarly in Deborah 0., because both the student and the teacher denied involve-
ment with each other to the school and the student's parents, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
19194, at *2, the school could not be held liable because they did not have notice of
the teacher's conduct. Id. at *12.
87. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 54 F.3d 1446, 1447(9th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 949 F. Supp. 1415
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
88. A. Phillips Brooks, When Flirting Becomes Hurting in the Schools, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 7, 1995, at Al.
392
PEER HARASSMENT
A. Cases Supporting Peer Harassment as a Valid Cause
of Action
For a successful hostile environment sexual harassment claim
under Title IX, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her school district,
through one of its agents, subjected her to unwelcome sexual har-
assment thereby creating district liability.89 In peer harassment
cases, liability stems from the actions of a third party. Because
peer harassment does not involve a state actor or teacher through
which the school may be held liable, the court must determine
whether the harassment is pervasive enough that the school dis-
trict should have known about the hostile environment. Several
courts have found peer harassment to be a valid Title IX claim
under this theory.
1. The Nature of Liability and the Intent Requirement
Liability in peer harassment cases is based on the schools reac-
tion to harassment-whether the school acts unwisely to remedy
the hostile environment or fails to take action at all. The courts
rely on the Standards asserted in Meritor, that the school district is
liable if the school district knew or should have known of the har-
assment and failed to take appropriate action.90 Knowledge of the
harassment may be either active or constructive.91 The pervasive-
89. Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 174 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (indicating that to be unwelcome, the harassment must "have interfered with a
reasonable person's .. . performance and . . . emotional well-being" (citation
omitted)).
90. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (creating liability through making Title IX a
right to be protected under § 1983); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp.
1452 (N.D. Ca. 1995).
Also very important to the Petaluma decisions is that the lower court stated that
Franklin was essentially a hostile environment case and the court couldn't deny mone-
tary damages because it would contravene the Supreme Court decision. Petaluma,
830 F. Supp. at 1576.
Petaluma was also the first Title IX peer sexual harassment to go to the Court of
Appeals and succeed. 830 F. Supp. 1560. The lower court determined that the stan-
dard of liability should be a "known or should have known" standard and a showing
of intent which may be based on the circumstances of the case. Petaluma, 830 F.
Supp. at 1576. These circumstances could include the school district's failure to act.
Id. However, in light of the cases which came after its initial decision, the higher
court reconsidered, deciding that liability must be based on "the district's own con-
duct of knowingly permitting the discriminatory hostile and abusive environment to
continue." Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
The court adopted the Title VII standard, giving the plaintiff a better chance of suc-
cess under Title IX peer harassment. Therefore, according to the newest Petaluma
decision, the "known or should have known" standard may be enough.
91. Oona R.-S., 890 F. Supp. at 1469.
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ness of the harassment creates an inference of constructive knowl-
edge on the school district and complaints to higher management
establish actual knowledge of the harassment. 92
To obtain damages in a peer environment case, the plaintiff must
prove that the school district 93 acted with intent to discriminate on
the basis of sex.94 Meritor's "knew or should have known" stan-
dard may not be enough to establish this intent.95 The question of
what intentional harassment is under Title IX for peer harassment
cases is under dispute.96 Case law in favor of peer harassment as a
cause of action indicates that "intentional" discrimination requires
a school district to have willfully disregarded actual or constructive
notice by taking unreasonably lenient action.97 "[A]n employer
who knows or reasonably should have known of a hostile environ-
ment is liable even if it attempts in good faith to eliminate the hos-
tile environment if it is found that the employer's efforts were not
reasonably calculated to end the hostile environment." 98 Discrimi-
92. See id. (finding that "[discriminatory intent] may manifest itself in the active
encouragement of peer harassment, the toleration of the harassing behavior of the
male student, or the failure to take adequate steps to deter or punish peer
harassment").
93. Actions under Title IX may not be brought against the individual. Petaluma,
830 F. Supp. at 1576-77. In codifying Cannon's holding that there is an implied right
of action under Title IX, the 1986 amendment to Title IX is "consistent with the con-
clusion that there is no private right of action against individuals, since only remedies
against 'public or private entities' are mentioned." Id. at 1577.
94. Id. at 1571.
95. It is clear that in hostile environment harassment cases, teachers, as adults, are
acting intentionally when they harass a student. The school's liability for the acts of
students is more tenuous and as such, the Petaluma lower court emphasized that
school liability requires intent. In the most recent Petaluma decision, 949 F. Supp.
1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the court describes two elements of intent in a hostile environ-
ment case: "the harasser's intentional disparate treatment based on gender and the
employer's act of implicitly condoning that disparate treatment by knowingly failing
to take steps to remedy it." Id. at 1424. This indicates that, in a case of peer sexual
harassment, the plaintiff must be able to prove that the school acted or failed to act in
such a way as to support the harassing behavior.
96. Gail Sorenson, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guidelines Under Fed-
eral Law, 92 EDuc. L. REP. 1, 3-4 (1994) (indicating that "[i]mplicit in the Supreme
Court's [decision] was the suggestion that the school board, as a corporate entity,
could be held liable for compensatory damages despite lack of actual knowledge ....
What is less clear is whether the holding applies only to 'intentional' discrimination,
and if so, precisely what intentional means").
97. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1021-1022 (W.D. Mo.
1995) (finding liability where the school has chosen a course of action, at least in part,
"because of the plaintiff's sex" and determining that a school district may also be
liable where the school district "has knowledge of a sexually hostile environment and
takes no action").
98. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576.
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natory intent is not the same as discriminatory motive. One cannot
determine the motives behind school policy or administrative ac-
tions. However, the court may infer the school's intent through the
circumstances of the case. "[T]he cumulative evidence of action
and inaction ... objectively manifests discriminatory intent." 99
Therefore, intent is what is shown by the school system's response
to sexual harassment claims. 100
Franklin states that if the harassment is intentional, the school is
on notice of the fact that it may be liable for monetary damages.101
Without this option, the plaintiff may only receive injunctive relief
where it is available. Specific instances of harassment create a
cause of action under Title IX and the school district's intent is
determined by its response to harassment generally as well as in
the case being decided. The school district does not require warn-
ing of the possibility of damages in peer harassment cases because
"hostile environment harassment" case law has indicated that inac-
tion or inappropriate action demonstrate the school district's intent
to discriminate on the basis of sex. The assumption that the school
"should have known" about student harassment puts school dis-
tricts on notice of possible liability for any sexual harassment which
creates a hostile environment for the student, especially after the
Supreme Court notified school districts that they may be liable for
not responding to sexual harassment.10 2
99. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1020.
100. The most recent cases support this premise. Adopting a 10th Circuit test,
these cases decided that all the circumstances of the case may be taken into account in
determining intent. Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193,
1205-1206 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (adopting a five-part test stating that intent may be
proven through direct or indirect evidence). The court considered the "totality of
relevant evidence from which intent may be inferred." Id. at 1205.
This standard is not intended to create successful suits for all plaintiffs; see Wright v.
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996). The court in
this case found that there was no intent to discriminate because the school took steps
to control harassing behavior. More than a negligence standard is required. Id. at
1419-1420. See also Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 177
(N.D.N.Y. 1996)(deciding that school districts must at least provide an avenue for
complaint).
101. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992). The Court
stated that if the harassment is unintentional, the school must be given notice so that
it would have the opportunity to address the situation. Id. at 74-75; see generally,
Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 173 (holding that the plaintiff must show actual notice of
sexually harassing conduct before the school district may be held liable because stu-
dents are not generally considered school agents). However, the Bruneau court illus-
trated this actual intent through the mere fact that the student informed school agents
of the harassment. Id. at 173-74.
102. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
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Opponents to allowing the peer harassment cause of action
under Title IX state that Petaluma does not offer any evidence that
Franklin, as a teacher hostile environment case, applies directly to
Petaluma, a peer harassment case. 10 3 One view of Franklin is that
the Court imputes liability to the school district through agency
principles, making the school district directly liable for the acts of
its agents.'04 In cases involving student-to-student harassment, vi-
carious liability cannot give rise to Title IX liability because the
school is not liable for the actions of third parties.10 5 Under this
theory school districts may be held liable for the acts of anyone
entering the school or hanging around outside the school yard.
However, Franklin also states that the school district was liable for
the harassment because the principle failed to help the plaintiff
when he heard complains of sexual harassment. 10 6 Under this the-
ory of liability, the Petaluma court is well rooted in precedent and
intent may be demonstrated by the school system's failure to act.
Opposition to peer harassment also claims that allowing this
cause of action would cause schools to lose much needed federal
money upon a determination that the school is liable. 10 7 This
would lead to the schools' inability to fund educational programs
as well as programs against sexual harassment. This concern
proves illusory, however, because the school will only be held lia-
ble in cases where there was no prompt or proper action taken in
response to the harassment complaints. The issue is not that silent
plaintiffs may recover from the school because it did not know of
the harassment. 10 8 In peer harassment cases, once the student
complains that she is being harassed and the harassment may be
103. See Sorenson, supra note 96, at 4-5 (stating that Petaluma appears to gloss over
the differences between teacher-student harassment and peer harassment in deciding
to extend Title IX to cover peer harassment).
104. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575.
105. Also note that Meritor, on which Franklin relies, rejects respondeat superior
liability in favor of agency principles. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986). The Meritor Court also admits that agency principles may not be directly
applicable to hostile environment harassment cases. Id.
106. Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Sup. 1288, 1297 (1993) (hold-
ing that liability is based on at least a constructive notice of the harassment and a
"knowing failure to act"). The court analogizes to Franklin, stating that the Gwinnett
School District could be held liable after the victims' mother complained to the princi-
pal and he refused to take action and help her. Id.
107. Kirsten M. Erickson, What Our Children are Learning in School: Using Title
IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. L.J. 1799, 1817 (1995).
108. See Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(looking to whether the plaintiff complained to the administration about peer sexual
harassment as an important contested fact in the case).
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established, courts must scrutinize the school's response. Summary
judgment of Title IX claims was denied in part where the plaintiff
let the defendant school district know about the harassment and
the defendant's response was inadequate. 109 The response or lack
thereof indicates the schools' dedication to a safe environment.
Therefore, peer harassment liability should be supported where the
school knew or should have known about the harassment and did
nothing about it.
2. The Nature of the Harassment
In assessing peer harassment cases, courts generally consider
"the frequency of the discriminating conduct; its severity; whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or... mere[ly an] offen-
sive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with [the
victim's] work performance." 1" 0
Where the harassment continued over an extended period of
time, and the harassment was extreme, the court found a valid Title
IX claim."' In Doe v. Petaluma City School District,"2 the plaintiff
alleged that, while in the seventh grade, she was repeatedly the
subject of harassment by fellow students, consisting primarily of
sexual comments about her having a hotdog in her pants or her
having sex with a hotdog. 1 3 School officials did nothing after Jane
told them about the situation which continued into spring of the
following school year." 4
109. See Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (indicating that the intent to discriminate is-revealed by the school dis-
trict's failure to respond to Lisa's complaints, as well as reports by "her [p]arents, her
attorney, various teachers and the OCR"). Evidence provided to the court included
evidence that the school failed to follow proper procedure and the school character-
ized the harassment as "picking on each other." Id.
110. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
111. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995). From
March 1992 to October 1993, Id. at 1015-16, Jennifer was subject to many incidents of
sexual harassment including a male student rubbing himself against her in the class
and rumors circulating about her being lesbian. Id. at 1024
112. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995). Jane was being called violent names,
including "hot dog bitch," "slut," and "hoe," on a daily basis. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp.
at 1565. She was also slapped by another student. Id. This harassment continued for
over a year. Id. Neither she or her parents were ever informed that there was a Title
IX Grievance policy in place at the school. Id. In fact, until Jane was slapped, the
counselor, Mr. Homrighouse claimed he could do nothing until someone actually hit
Jane and also responded to the complaints that sooner or later the kids would stop
harassing Jane. Id.
113. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1564.
114. Id.
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OCR findings and reports support the idea that peer harassment
can give rise to Title IX liability.1 5 Letters of Findings, though not
formal regulations, deserve deference because they represent the
opinion of the agency charged with enforcing Title IX "6 The
OCR treats both student-to-student harassment and student-
teacher harassment as valid types of hostile environment claims. 117
If harassment is shown, the district will still not be held liable un-
less the district did not act in a timely and effective manner to deal
with the abusive situation. 1 8 Because of the harmful effects sexual
harassment can have on young female students and the school's
concern about liability for peer harassment under the hostile envi-
ronment theory, "public officials have an especially compelling
duty not to tolerate it in the classrooms and hallways of...
schools."19
B. Courts Rejecting the Peer Harassment Cause of Action
Courts that reject peer harassment as a valid Title IX claim often
conclude that imposing a duty on school districts to eliminate stu-
dent-on-student harassment based on a "known or should have
known"standard would prove overly burdensome 20 In the alterna-
tive, some courts have concluded that Franklin cannot provide a
foundation for school liability for peer sexual harassment.'12
1. The Recipients of Federal Funds and Their Liability
Only the recipients of federal funds may be held liable for peer
sexual harassment. 2 2 The Rowinsky court states that because Title
IX was created pursuant to Congress' spending power, the most
"probable inference is that the condition [imposed by the federal
115. Id. at 1573.
116. Id. Even Meritor looks to the agency in charge of Title VII, the EEOC, to
support its holding concerning the two types of sexual harassment. See Meritor, 477
U.S. at 65.
117. Sorenson, supra note 103, at *6.
118. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1573.
119. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 35 F.3d 1396, 1401-1402 (9th Cir. 1994). A
fifteen-year-old student with Tourette's syndrome was removed from his classroom
because he caused disruptions in class by making frequent sexual comments towards
other students. 35 F.3d at 1396. The court used a policy reason to decide that remov-
ing Clyde was not unreasonable or a violation of Title IX.
120. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996)(indicat-
ing that there is no basis for a peer harassment cause of action when male and female
students were punished in a similar manner).
121. Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn 1995); Garza v. Galena Park
Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
122. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1996).
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grant] prohibits certain behavior by the grant recipients them-
selves" and not the behavior of third parties. 2 3 In order for the
conditions of the statute to be effective, the conditions must not be.
too difficult to follow.' 24 The Fifth Circuit contends that peer har-
assment would create the unreasonable requirement of having the
school be responsible for the actions of numerous third parties and
would thus require an affirmative showing of discrimination by the
school and school administrators. 125
This proposition assumes that the plaintiff is not required to
show a great deal to succeed in a peer harassment claim. However,
almost half the OCR Letters of Findings concerning peer harass-
ment have found the school district not liable. 26 To succeed in
court, case law shows that the knew or should have known stan-
dard is not enough, by itself, to impute liability on the school dis-
trict. 127  Harris has also contributed to the elements of sexual
harassment by requiring that the harassment must be pervasive
enough to constitute harassment. 28 There are standards which
must be met by the plaintiff in bringing the claim of peer sexual
harassment. Additionally, the school district's "failure to act" cre-
ates its liability. 129 Courts have determined that it makes sense to
hold a school district liable for its action or inaction. 130
Rowinsky takes the "known or should have known standard far
enough to make it almost impossible for the victim to find the
school district liable. This case demands that the plaintiff show that
the school district, in their actions, treated complaints of harass-
ment differently on the basis of sex.' 31 That the school district did
not respond to harassment would not be enough because only ac-
tive discrimination would show discriminatory animus.132  The
123. 80 F.3d at 1013. In this case, students physically and verbally abused plaintiffs
Jane and Janet Doe. When they complained to school officials, minimal efforts were
made to address their concerns and they were never informed about Title IX or sex-
ual harassment procedures. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1013, 1016
126. Sorenson, supra note 96, at 10.
127. See supra Part II.A.
128. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
129. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
130. The focus of the peer sexual harassment cause of action is the school district's
failure to act. Though the Rowinsky district court decision decided that there was no
peer sexual harassment actionable under Title IX because the students, male and fe-
male, were punished equally, the fact remains that the school district should be held
liable for the creation of a hostile environment. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010.
131. Id. at 1016.
132. Id.
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Rowinsky Court also mistates the nature of hostile environment
harassment. Rowinsky bases its holding on the fact that they are
looking at the school's liability for the actions of third parties and
not looking at the issue as whether the school district should be
held liable based on their failure to act in the face of harassment or
their active support of the harassment. 133 This assumption pro-
vides for inconsistent decisions because of Rowinsky's theory that
there is school liability only where the school district treats girls'
complaints differently from those of boys.13 4 This premise would
encourage schools to do nothing about all peer harassment to
avoid disparate treatment.
Courts in favor of a more broad theory of liability find that the
school district should be held liable for indirect as well as direct
harassment. 35 This flexible standard allows courts to take the "to-
tality of the circumstances" into account. 36
2. The Inability to Find Peer Harassment from Hostile
Environment Harassment
After determining that the individual may be held liable for inac-
tion under Title IX in a peer harassment case, 37 the Mennone
court decided that although antidiscrimination law mandates a
clear duty to protect students from teacher-student harassment,
"[t]he extension of liability for failure to protect against student-to-
133. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
134. Id. The Petaluma court indicates that so long as the harassment is treated the
same, regardless of its severity, the school will not be held liable. Id.
135. Id. (adopting the Title VII "knew or should have known" standard); Burrow,
929 F. Supp. at 1205 (holding that the plaintiff must show intent through direct or
indirect evidence to find school liability); Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1020 (determining
that cumulative evidence of intent creates liability).
136. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1021, 1023 (looking towards the totality of the circum-
stances and circumstantial evidence in the case to create liability); Oona R.-S., 890 F.
Supp. at 1459 (looking at the facts to find a manifestation of intent).
137. Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1995). The defendant,
James Bouchard, a high school teacher, stood by and did nothing as plaintiff Johna
Mennone was continually harassed and assaulted by another student, Scott Randall.
Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 54-55. He made remarks about her breasts, grabbed her
hair, buttocks and legs, and threatened to rape her on numerous occasions. Id at 55.
The school district became aware of Randall's behavior after Mennone filed a com-
plaint with the police and did nothing to discipline him. Id.
The Mennone court looked at the plain language of the statute, and saw that Title
IX does not clearly prohibit the statute's application to an individual. Id. at 56. An
individual may fall under the statute so long as they exercise some level of control
within the program or activity because those who operate the program, usually have
the power to prevent discrimination. Id. But see Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830
F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that the individuals may not be held
personally liable under Title IX).
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student behavior does not clearly flow from prior sexual harass-
ment and duty to protect cases.' 1 38 Franklin does not support peer
sexual harassment because it is a case concerning coach/teacher
against student sexual harassment, not student against student.
139
Even if courts decided to follow Petaluma's holding that peer har-
assment is a valid cause of action, some courts require that the
plaintiff show more than a "knew or should have known" stan-
dard.1 40 The plaintiff's claim that the school had knowledge of the
harassment was not enough.' 41
Where a plaintiff was taped to a towel rack by his teammates
after coming out of the locker room shower and then displayed to
his prom date, 42 the court found that though the school created
and tolerated a hostile educational environment, it was not based
on sex.143 Even if the court supported the Title VII's hostile envi-
ronment theory, the plaintiff failed to show that there were "unwel-
come sexual advances" or "requests for sexual favors."'144 Though
138. Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 58 (D. Conn. 1995). Qualified immunity
was applied because Buchard, a government official, did not violate a clearly estab-
lished constitutional or statutory right which existed at the time the events occurred.
Therefore, he was not liable for a violation of Title IX.
139. Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex.
1994).
140. The plaintiff should show "evidence of intentional gender-based discrimina-
tion." Garza, 914 F. Supp. at 1438. The student was sexually harassed and assaulted
by a male student at her high school and claimed that the defendants knew about the
boy's conduct. These are the only facts given by the court so it is difficult to deter-
mine what the court requires to show intent). Id.
141. Id. The reluctance of some of these courts to find peer sexual harassment,
may stem from the assertion that Title VII does not apply to Title IX and, in fact,
should be analyzed under Title VI. Garza states that a student cannot bring a hostile
environment claim under Title IX. Id. (citing Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713
F. Supp. 139, 145 (W.D. Pa.) affd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Bougher holds that Title VII's hostile environment theory cannot be applied to Title
IX cases because the court is obligated to analyze Title IX through its closest counter-
part, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The district court applied a standard stemming
directly from Title IX indicating that to show a prima facie case of sexual discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff must show that she was excluded from participation or denied bene-
fits based on sex and that the program receives federal assistance. Bougher, 713 F.
Supp. at 143-144; see also Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1118 (D.Ct N.D. Utah
1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996)(stating that important
distinctions between Title IX and Title VII convince the court that the use of Title VII
to interpret Title IX is inappropriate). This creates a permanent barrier from a peer
harassment suit if the court even refuses to recognize that Title IX may support an
action against hostile environment sexual harassment.
142. Seamons, 864 F. Supp. at 1115.
143. Seamons, 84 F.3dat 1232-33; Seamons, 864 F. Supp. at 1117. Seamons was also
suspended from the football team after complaining, id. at 1115, and the season was
canceled, resulting in increased harassment against Seamons. Id. at 1117.
144. 864 F. Supp. at 1119.
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the incident itself was of a "sexual nature," there was no sexual
harassment.
Essentially, these cases decide that the actions of peers do not
fall within a program or activity. However, it is clear that if the
school district is not responsible for the actions of their students,
no one else will accept the liability. If the school cannot be made
accountable, schools may become very dangerous places for stu-
dents and the maintenance of a hostile environment, with no
means of halting it, will discourage attendance in schools as well as
create an hostile learning environment.
III. Guidelines for the Future of Peer Sexual Harassment
Students deserve the same protection that employees receive in
the workplace. 145 Sensitivity to the needs of students should be ad-
dressed by the creation and enforcement of sexual harassment poli-
cies and other initiatives. Just as the employer is not automatically
liable for the torts of his employees, the school district is not di-
rectly liable for the actions of third parties in peer harassment
cases. The school district is liable because of its failure to remedy
the harassment. This failure may be more detrimental in the
school environment because by allowing the harassment to take
place, the school is telling students that there is nothing wrong with
harassing behavior. As a result, the school district must initiate
programs that take into account the need to educate students
about harassment and allow the school district to avoid liability. It
is beneficial to look at the standards imposed by courts in Title VII
cases of hostile environment harassment for guidance.' 46
A. Liability
Instead of looking for "intent," courts should be looking at the
circumstances of each case and creating liability based on the
"known or should have known" standard. 4 7 Opponents to this
standard need not fear that school districts will be held liable re-
gardless of whether they tried to end peer harassment. 48
145. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992).
146. There are fundamental differences between Title VII and Title IX cases. The
administration does not have the same amount of control over the students as the
employer has over the employees generally. In Title VII harassment cases, there is
also a greater concern with Meritor's "unwelcomeness" requirement because there is
a fear that the victim may be bringing suit because of a romantic falling out with a co-
worker or supervisor. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
147. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
148. See supra note 100.
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If the school district has no policy addressing harassment, then
its schools may be found liable for the effects of student-to-student
harassment because the school clearly intended to do nothing when
faced with student harassment. 149 The OCR requires that a policy
be in place and the violation of this minimal requirement should
allow the victim to receive monetary damages, both compensatory
and punitive. The intent to discriminate would also be revealed
where an investigation finds that the policy is not being
enforced. 150
Where a school district tried to remedy the harassment and did
not succeed because of problems within the school system, or be-
cause of the way the policy is implemented, then it should still be
held liable for the harassment. However, the school district should
not be penalized to the same extent as a school district with no
policy. A school having no policy may be presumed to be ignoring
Title IX guidelines. The victim of the harassment should be able to
get compensatory damages but not punitive damages.
If the school does not intentionally discriminate, it would make
more sense for the court to allow injunctive or equitable relief
rather than monetary damages. 151 If the school made all appropri-
ate attempts to remedy the harassment, the school should not bear
the burden for the student's actions. 152 To punish the school for its
efforts would only frustrate the purpose underlying Title IX. The
school district may not be motivated to remedy harassment where
they would be found liable for the harasser's actions anyway. 153
This three-tiered liability scheme does not hurt the victim's inter-
149. Cf. Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1420 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (stating that the school district's failure to have a sexual harassment policy
was only negligent because the school district "took steps to punish known incidents
of harassment and promptly removed graffiti that had been posted about plaintiff.")
150. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1422 (N.D. Cal. 1996) *8 (stating that hostile
environment case law was developed as "a species of intentional discrimination.").
151. One should note that there are instances where the school should not be held
liable at all. The school should not be burdened with liability for the actions of a third
parties they cannot control through instruction or employment.
152. Even if the school does everything right, the harasser may not end his harass-
ment. In one instances, a school district took reasonable steps to discipline someone
who wrote sexually derogatory letters, including condemning peer harassment
throughout the school, allowing the victim to change classes and initiating a prompt
investigation. It is the schools' active role in combating harassment that allowed the
school district to avoid liability. Sorenson, supra note 96, at 7.
153. Though strict liability would provide the school district with the incentive to
reduce the probability of private action against it, it is not as equitable a method as
imposing three-tiered liability. With this new liability structure, school administrators
will understand what makes them liable for students harassing students, and the
guidelines created by school districts will be able to address claims more specifically.
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ests because where the harassment is pervasive enough to support
a cause of action, the victim may be able to take action against the
harasser under criminal statutes or tort law even where she cannot
recover from the school under Title IX. 154
Discriminatory intent is a fluid concept which is not easily ap-
plied in peer sexual harassment cases. 155 Because evidence of har-
assment may be regarded as circumstantial evidence of the intent
to discriminate, 56 courts should scrutinize the actions of the school
administration in light of harassing behavior of which they were
constructively aware. 157 The school district cannot be held strictly
liable for the actions of third parties. In peer harassment -cases,
liability may only be determined by looking at the hostile environ-
ment as a whole and not as a product of the individual harasser's
conduct. 158 A standard examining primarily the actions of the har-
asser would serve to minimize the school district's duty 5 towards
students to prevent harassment affecting their ability to' learn.
The courts should look to the OCR to determine what the
schools should be doing to avoid liability. Because the OCR inves-
tigates these situations thoroughly and has the best idea of what is
required for there to be a claim of peer sexual harassment, its opin-
ion should be very important. to the courts. For example, the OCR
generally holds that a school has violated Title IX if there is no
154. In cases involving younger children, the fault generally falls on the school dis-
trict because it can better control a harasser. The teacher may influence the child as
an authority figure or the school can call the harasser's parents. The harassment, in
these cases, is more likely the product of a misunderstanding than sexual animus. On
the other hand, the older harasser, a high school student for example, is less easily
controlled. The student may not respect authority and will harass his peer regardless
of the punishment. It is against these harassers that the victim will be able to recover
under tort or criminal law.
There are also problems determining whether a young defendant can be held liable
under criminal statutes. Suing the individual student may be complicated by new the-
ories of parental liability for the crimes and torts of their children.
155. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
156. Doe v. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp., 1560, 1576 (N.D. Ca. 1993); Bosley, 904 F.
Supp. at 1021. Though Bosley claims to treat the evidence of harassment as circum-
stantial, the court appears to regard the evidence of harassment as determinative and
a product of intentional harassment on the basis of sex.
157. Therefore "the cumulative evidence of action and inaction . . . objectively
manifests discriminatory intent." Id. at 1020 (quoting Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698
F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983). The Bosley court also makes it clear that intent can
be determined through direct evidence or indirectly through an inference from the
circumstances. Id. at 1021.
158. See Justin S. Weddle, Title VII Sexual Harassment: Recognizing An Employer's
Non-Delegable Duty To Prevent A Hostile Workplace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 724, 738
(1995) (indicating that courts tend to look at individual harasser's actions and their
impact on the victim and her environment in Title VII co-worker harassment cases).
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OCR coordinator for the school, no grievance procedure and chil-
drens' harassment claims are not communicated to the parents.159
The plaintiff's burden should end with the establishment of the sex-
ual harassment and the school should then show what they did in
response to the harassment and what measures they have in
place. 160 The school district should be held liable "unless the offi-
cial can show that he or she took appropriate steps" to stop the
harassment.16
Because intent may be established through circumstantial evi-
dence, school systems must play an active role in combating sexual
harassment in order to avoid liability. The school policy must
clearly define harassment in terms the students can understand.
62
It is more likely that students and schools will follow a clear policy
that takes harassment seriously. 63 Though a school might have a
grievance procedure, that alone does not insulate it from liabil-
ity.164 Appropriate procedures 65 and penalties are also very im-
portant parts of the policy because uniform enforcement will help
to maintain the policy and thwart initial allegations that the school
district discriminates on the basis of sex. This formal policy Will
159. Sorenson, supra note 96, at 6. Having an OCR coordinator is an affirmative
requirement through 34 C.F.R. §§106.8-106.9 (1989).
160. See supra note 150. Because of the reduced burden on the plaintiff in cases of
unintentional harassment, the damages under these cases should be limited. See gen-
erally Leija v. Canutillo Ind. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995).rev'd 101
F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996)(deciding, in district court, that damages received by the plain-
tiff for sexual harassment should be limited).
161. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988).
162. "First, have a policy spelling out for students what [is] OK and what [is] not.
Second, take sexual harassment seriously, because if the school systems don't, neither
will the students. Third, act quickly when allegations arise - and document every-
thing." Sherrell Evans, Schools Get Tough on Sexual Harassment: Pending Lawsuit
About Student-on-Student Contact and 1988 Gwinnett County Case are Prompting
Changes, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Dec. 17, 1995, at 8G.
The policy may enumerate the types of behavior having the potential to create a
hostile environment. For example, Atlanta prohibits "lewd or suggestive comments or
gestures; off-color language or jokes of a sexual nature; graphic or degrading verbal
comments about an individual or his/her physical attributes; display of sexually sug-
gestive objects, pictures, cards or letters." Id.
163. Id.
164. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
165. See Janet Hughie Smith and Rick Thaler, ALI-ABA Course of Study-Sex
Discrimination in the Workplace: Some Guidelines for Employers and Legal Update,
C983 ALI-ABA 135, 146-147 (1995) (An employer should also establish procedures
for conducting investigations into these claims including meeting with the com-
plaining party and then the harasser after determining all the facts of the case. This
data should be the product of a detailed investigation of the harasser and any other
incidents in which he was involved.).
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instill in the students that sexual harassment is wrong and that any-
one engaging in it will be punished.
B. The Nature and Pervasiveness of Student Conduct
The harassment must be of a sexual nature, sexual or based on
sex or gender. 166 The sexual conduct in peer sexual harassment
cases does not have to be physical in nature.167 OCR pursues Title
IX peer harassment cases ranging from graffiti to verbal and physi-
cal harassment. 168 The courts should consider the effect of the har-
assment on the student 169 as well as the duration of the
harassment. 170 The court should also look at objective measure-
ments of the victim's condition to determine the effect of the har-
assment- such as her grades and interaction with others in class and
outside of class. 71
Title IX examines discrimination on the basis of sex and should
not be extended to generally violent behavior between students.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. considers "the frequency of the dis-
criminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threaten-
ing or humiliating, or .. .merely an offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with [the victim's] work per-
formance.' 72 This language and peer harassment case law indicate
that there must be an emotional effect on the victim that causes her
to feel inadequate or humiliated by the harassing experience. The
experience should also be attributable to sex-either sexual or at-
tacking the victim's sexuality. It would unnecessarily complicate
peer harassment case law to create an overly broad definition of
what constitutes harassment under Title IX.
The peer harassment policy must address all harassment claims,
large or small, in a timely and effective manner. Liability, in many
166. A student rubbing himself in a suggestive manner in front of another student is
sexual harassment where calling another student a cow and asking if he could take her
home was not harassment of a sexual nature. Sorenson, supra note 96, at 7.
167. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988) (giving exam-
ples of harassment that is not physical in nature).
168. Id.
169. See Sherer, supra note 3, at 2130-31 (describing harassment as making the vic-
tim feel bad, angry, degraded, helpless, and cheap).
170. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
171. See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (N. D.
Cal. 1993). Rebecca H. had problems with attendance and lateness during the 1989
school year, ending it with Ds and Fs the second semester. Id. at 1295. A therapist
also described her as suffering from post traumatic stress because of the molestation.
Id.
172. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
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cases, depends on prompt and appropriate responses to harass-
ment.173 If the case gets to court, the quality of the school investi-
gation should be taken into account in determining whether the
school is liable for a failure to act when faced with harassment.
This clearly would affect whether the victim may receive compen-
satory and/or punitive damages. Prompt action will prevent the es-
calation of smaller incidents like teasing. Under the current case
law, the plaintiff would be unable to allege severe and pervasive
harassment requiring compensation if there were only a few inci-
dents of harassment.
A Title IX coordinator should be appointed to handle the
claims.174 This person should also play an active role in educating
students on what is acceptable behavior. By conducting seminars
on sexual harassment in the schools each year or during each se-
mester, the students will find the coordinator approachable should
anything happen to them. The coordinator will also be able to de-
termine whether the student has been sexual harassed. The Gwin-
nett County school district has gone so far as to create a sexual
harassment curriculum. 175 Both California and Minnesota have
adopted codes requiring all public schools to distribute sexual har-
assment policies.176 Teachers and administrators should also be ed-
ucated about sexual harassment 177 so that they will know what
sexual harassment is, recognize when their students are being
harassed and report the harassment. Such a policy must be uni-
form throughout the district and accessible to all students and
faculty.' 78 A clear policy will facilitate handling cases and create a
school-wide awareness of sexual harassment which may produce a
hostile environment.
Conclusion
It has been up to the Circuit Courts to determine the liability of
the school district in keeping with the Congressional vision to deny
173. Sorenson, supra note 96, at 7; see also Smith and Thaler, supra note 165, at 146
(stating at in Title VII co-worker cases, prompt remedial action is an important factor
in assuring that the sexual harassment policy is followed).
174. See supra note 159.
175. Evans, supra note 162, at 8G.
176. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.6 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.46 (West 1994
and Supp. 1997).
177. See Smith and Thaler, supra note 165, at 138 (advocating educating managers,
supervisors and other people in mid-to-high level positions about harassment in the
workplace).
178. See id. at 137 (indicating that a written sexual harassment policy should be
distributed making clear what the law is and what the employer prohibits).
1997]
408 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
federal funds to those who discriminate on the basis of sex.
Through a broad interpretation of Title IX's intent requirement,
the "known or should have known" standard, the students may get
the protection they deserve. Without safeguards in place and the
schools' ability and obligation to look after the children and hear
their complaints, children will receive a message that this type of
behavior is acceptable. The school district must be held liable be-
cause common sense tells us that schools and their teachers have
the responsibility to act when a child is harassed by her peers.
